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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper gives a range of sustainable agricultural policy recommendations, based on 
the results of the previous CEESA research phases. We begin by a brief presentation of 
the Romanian case study dealing with the environmental awareness of farmers, meas-
ured by means of agri-environmental indicators and discrete choice modelling. Then, 
we present the policy instruments dealing with non-point source pollution from agricul-
ture, focusing on those applied in the European Union, that are most likely to be used in 
accession countries. Here we briefly introduce the Romanian environmental institu-
tional and legislative framework, emphasising the existent water policy instruments. We 
end up by proposing sustainable agricultural policies that, based on the insights of our 
case study, we consider to be most appropriate for the case of Romania.  
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1 INTRODUCTION - BRIEF REVIEW OF THE PRECEDING CEESA OUTCOME 
1.1 AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS1  
The case study was carried out in Cazanesti agricultural region, crossed by Ialomita 
River and located in the south-eastern part of Romania. The commune is characterised 
by lack of economic activity diversification resulting in an excessive dependency on 
agriculture. The low economic efficiency in agricultural activities is due to the high de-
gree of land ownership fragmentation, obsolete agricultural machinery, poor infrastruc-
ture and a high percentage of elderly people employed in agriculture.  
 
The environmental situation in the area is poor as regards to water pollution from agri-
cultural sources. The specific problem that the case study deals with is non-point source 
pollution of water with discharges from agriculture (mainly waste from animal farms). 
The analysis of agri-environmental indicators2 in the case study area reveals a typical 
picture of the Romanian farming systems’ development during the last decade having 
produced contradictory impacts on the environment. In case of water pollution, the de-
preciation of farming systems’ economic situation led to a decreasing use of potentially 
polluting inputs and to lower livestock numbers. Hence, water pollution from agricul-
ture decreased. On the other hand, lack of financial means led to ignorance of environ-
mental conservation and to abandonment of unproductive land.  
 
Farm socio-economic characteristics  
The number of farms and the farm size have remained relatively constant during the last 
decade. There are 1,100 rural household farms (average size of 3.74 hectares and an 
average number of plots of 1.83), 3 legal agricultural associations (average size of 914 
hectares) and 1 family agricultural association (size of 73 hectares).  
 
About 97 percent of agricultural land are used for arable farming, 2 percent is under 
permanent pasture, and vineyards and orchards account for about 1 percent. There are 
hardly any changes in agricultural land use during the last decade (a shift toward more 
extensive types of farming, such as pasture and meadows, generally suggests less poten-
tial impact on environment, provided however, that the lands management is environ-
mentally sound).  
 
The fact that more than half of the farmers (59 percent) is over 55 years old is not an 
encouraging sign of the potential long-term viability of agriculture, given that younger 
well-educated farmers are more likely in favour of changing economic and environ-
mental conditions. Male farmers predominate (65 percent for household farms). Twenty 
six percent of the farm managers have graduated from highschool or college, which is 
quite promising as they are regarded to be driving forces for changes.  
 
The region is characterised by a high rate of off-farm activity. Consequently, although 
all farm managers are occupied in agriculture, many of them consider it as an auxiliary 
job. Over two thirds spend more than 75 percent of their time in agriculture. A total of 
58 percent of the farmers have preserved their occupational status, the others were pre-
                                                 
1 Toma, 2002a. 
2 We applied the OECD scheme of agri-environmental indicators (OECD 1999, 2001). 
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viously employed in food industry, services and trade (in equal shares of about 14 per 
cent). The previous non-agricultural occupation is consistent with the high unemploy-
ment in industry and service sector. In principle, the fact that more than half of the 
farmers has always been occupied in agriculture would mean that they have greater ex-
perience and are more likely to apply better agricultural practices. 
 
The number of workers hired on a permanent or temporary basis provides evidence of 
the farm economic viability, indicator of a potentially higher environmentally friendly 
behaviour. Household farms that hire labour (9 percent) keep above-average livestock 
numbers (12.2 livestock heads compared to 4.83 average per commune). As regards 
dairy farming, 100 percent of farms with more than 3 cows hire labour. That is even of 
greater importance for protection of the environment since dairy farming is less inten-
sive.  
 
Farm financial resources 
From among the farmers that made agricultural investments (13.3 percent), 38 percent 
invested in livestock and 16 percent in machinery and dwellings. No farmer invested in 
land. The agricultural investment structure presents a low financial profile of the house-
hold farms in the sample. Moreover, the alleged type of credit sources (either relatives 
or friends, and, unsurprisingly, no banks) implies farmers’ risk aversion and the scarcity 
of collaterals.  
 
Farm management and the environment 
Cazanesti sample has no farms with nutrient management plans. Chemical and organic 
fertilisers are applied without precise measurement of crop uptake (100-150 kg NPK per 
hectare; there are no exact figures on manure application). There is a reasonable under-
standing of crop needs and nutrient availability at different growth stages and these 
needs are efficiently met by nutrient applications. However, scientific knowledge is 
often impeded by shortcomings in practice (availability of cash or credit to buy inputs, 
tendency to cultivate more profitable crops sometimes at odds with proper crop rotation, 
low funding for soil testing, etc.).  
 
We can speak of a ‘relaxed’ integrated pest management, as scientific knowledge has 
been adjusted to practical circumstances. While crop rotation is more or less respected, 
there is no use of biological pesticides in the sample area but of chemical ones (on aver-
age 1 kg active ingredient of pesticides per hectare).  
 
The same holds true of environmental land management practices. There are no strict 
rules like zero-tillage practices, contour cultivation, strip-cropping. Cazanesti area has 
had a low efficiency irrigation system, based on flooding. Flooding technology is the 
least efficient type of irrigation system and implies high environmental risks.  
 
1.2 WATER POLLUTION IN THE CASE STUDY AREA3 
Chemical and organic fertilisers and pesticides have been the main agricultural pollut-
ants in the sample area. The decrease in the use of chemical fertilisers in 1990s was an 
important factor in reducing water pollution in recent years. Pollution from organic fer-
tilisers has also declined due to the smaller livestock numbers. On annual average, con-
                                                 
3 Toma, 2002a. 
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centrations (monthly measured by the National Company “Romanian Waters”) have 
fallen below maximum allowable limits (MAL) in surface waters (Ialomita River), but 
they still exceed threshold pollutant values in groundwater. This can be explained by a 
slower process of self-decontamination of groundwater. The extent of groundwater pol-
lution from agricultural nutrients is less documented than surface water pollution, 
largely because of the cost involved in groundwater sampling. Moreover, it is difficult 
to correlate nutrient contamination levels in groundwater with changes in farming prac-
tices and production systems, because it can take many years for nutrients to leach 
through overlying soils into aquifers. 
 
Groundwater in the sample area shows a high nitrate content (due to agricultural leak-
age). Sanitary controls revealed that water from wells exceeds maximum allowable lim-
its of pollutant concentrations (mainly nitrates) and is neither drinkable for humans nor 
for livestock.  
 
In the sample area, both agricultural and non-agricultural sources– livestock and crop 
farms, and household waste disposal – have contributed to the increase in harmful sub-
stances exceeding MAL that were detected between the two receptor points (upstream 
and downstream the critical area) on Ialomita River. Both sources of contamination are 
harmful to the environment, although to different extents. Summing up, the main pollu-
tion problem has been diffuse source contamination of water resources with livestock 
waste. 
 
According to the different chemical component concentrations, Ialomita River water 
was categorised into different qualities. Among the chemical components whose level 
might have increased due to agricultural sources (livestock and crop farming) in the 
sample area, Cl- and Na+ exceeded the MAL for fixed residues, on yearly average, and 
the river water was categorised as ‘degraded water’.  
 
On a yearly average, some chemical components do not exceed maximum allowable 
limits as to be included in ‘degraded water’ category (although they are included in the 
2nd or 3rd categories, unfit for livestock consumption and aquatic fauna), but they show 
above-MAL values during some months (spring and autumn). This time relation is 
likely to be associated with either livestock waste disposal accidents that are penalised 
by the environmental agency, and with the application of fertilisers during spring and 
autumn agricultural operations. However, it is impossible for the environmental agency 
or local authorities to render permanent monitoring of farms for improper household 
and livestock waste disposal practices.  
 
Parameters, that indicate salinity (fixed residues, Cl-, Na+), exceed MAL on a yearly 
average. These are elements whose concentrations are strongly dependent on dilution by 
rainfall, which is another factor to explain for the high dispersion of concentrations over 
time. From a multiple correlation analysis, we conclude a very strong correlation be-
tween these parameters (Pearson coefficient takes values between 0.87 and 0.97), sug-
gesting a common origin for these groups of variables, which, in our case, is livestock 
waste. The analysis of bacteriological samples taken from wells in 2000 revealed a 
strong bacterial contamination of the wells and their water that proved to be unfit for 
drinking during more than 80 percent of the time in a year period. As a result of our 
survey, 28.3 percent of respondents consider that drinking water quality in the com-
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mune is impairing human health, 63.6 percent are not aware of the direct effect of water 
quality on human health, and 8.1 percent do not answer.  
 
A total of 44.4 percent of farmers use the long strip of pasture following closely the 
right bank of the Ialomita River for livestock grazing, on average six months per year. 
Out of these farmers, 60 percent consider that the pasture quality is poor, either due to 
poor maintenance or due to pollution. Veterinary services are used by 15.5 percent 
farmers for cases of livestock indigestion caused by infested drinking water and 20 per-
cent for other livestock diseases, not including the regular checks.  
 
Related to household waste disposal, 80.8 percent of the farmers declare to have used 
community garbage platforms, the rest store it in their backyard and burn it later on. 
Livestock waste is disposed on the same community garbage platforms by 71.7 percent 
of farmers, 13.1 percent dump it in their own backyards or on the fields, 14.1 percent do 
not answer and only 1 percent use it properly as organic fertiliser. 
 
1.3 DISCRETE CHOICE MODELLING4  
The subsequent methodological step in our CEESA analysis dealt with random utility 
theory to analyse the economic and environmental trade-offs at farm level in the Ca-
zanesti case study. 
 
It is difficult to identify a unique social preference criterion related to agricultural and 
environmental policies as the decision-making process is influenced by multiple com-
peting objectives (Toman, 1994). Farmers are mainly concerned with farm profitability 
and less with resource conservation, unless in clear cases where there is a direct propor-
tional relation between the two objectives. But in most cases, the economic and envi-
ronmental objectives are competitive.  
 
Agricultural policy analysis should consider multiple objectives referring to farm in-
come, soil erosion, nitrate leaching, waste storage and any other surface and groundwa-
ter quality indicators because all of these measures are interrelated. Although there is 
not necessarily a direct trade-off between water quality and farm profitability for a pro-
posed policy change, economic-environmental trade-offs are common in agricultural 
production.  
 
A potential use of the trade-off information is to derive a utility function for a decision-
maker by presenting the trade-off information. Decision-makers can be asked whether 
they are willing to move between two points, that represent efficient combinations of 
the different objectives. These points are taken from the estimated efficient trade-off 
surface rather than chosen arbitrarily. Once a utility function for a particular decision-
maker is derived, it can be used to identify the most preferred point on the efficient 
trade-off surface. While different decision-makers can have different utility functions, 
they all face the same and unique trade-off surface. 
 
For underlining the impact of socio-economic variables in the decision-making process 
at farm level as regards environmental choices, we estimated and compared two binary 
logit models. The first was the basic ‘restricted model’, which showed the importance of 
                                                 
4 Toma, 2002b. 
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choice set attributes in explaining farmers’ environmental choices. The second ‘ex-
tended model’ included socio-economic variables in addition to the attributes in the 
choice set. 
 
We derived the utility functions generated by two options that were based on the bundle 
of attributes of ‘environmental effort’ to assess the impact of the current ‘environmental 
quality’. The models provided an estimate of the effect of a change in each attribute on 
the probability that one of the options was chosen.  
 
In making his choice between the two options, the farmer compares the increased envi-
ronmental effort (from ‘no effort’ to ‘significant effort’) with the change in water qual-
ity (from ‘polluted water’ to ‘clean water’). The first option is chosen if farmer’s wel-
fare from the first option’s level of attributes is higher than the welfare generated by the 
second option. Namely, farmer’s choice is the result of the comparison of the utilities 
predicted for each option. The second model introduces socio-economic variables in 
addition to the attributes used in the choice sets. The use of socio-economic variables as 
independent variables is justified under the hypothesis that socio-economic characteris-
tics are separate factors influencing environmental behavioural intentions and behav-
iour. 
 
The coefficients for attributes in the choice set were found significant and with the a 
priori expected sign. The impact of ‘environmental efforts’ on farmers’ choice was 
higher than their attitude towards water pollution. Among the socio-economic variables 
considered (all variables’ coefficients having the a priori sign), half of them were sig-
nificant (age, main occupation, land ownership, dwellings ownership, investment be-
haviour). The impact of these variables on farmers’ choices towards environment has a 
strong empirical reasoning (underlying the discussion on agri-environmental indicators 
above). 
 
Compared to the restricted model, the explanatory power of the extended model in-
creased. Thus, adding the block of socio-economic variables proved to be justified both 
theoretically and empirically. Besides the theoretical advantages, they presented the 
benefit of analysing farmers’ environmental decisions based on their socio-economic 
situation. As the ‘environmental efforts’ variable is more significant than the ‘environ-
mental quality’, it is easy to deduce the reasoning behind it, namely the low capability 
of farmers to perform these efforts. This fact is consistent with the insights of the above 
discussion on the socio-economic variables, notwithstanding farmers’ being seriously 
concerned about their own health and that of their livestock, together with general 
community welfare.  
 
2 NON-POINT SOURCE POLLUTION (NPS) ABATEMENT POLICY INSTRUMENTS - 
ANALYSIS OF THEIR APPROPRIATENESS IN THE CASE OF ROMANIA 
2.1 NON-POINT SOURCE POLLUTION ABATEMENT POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
NPS pollution problems mainly refer to emissions by small sources (e.g. household 
farms) and include nutrient pollution, pesticide pollution, sedimentation, and hazardous 
and solid wastes. Monitoring individual emissions, that are associated with farming ac-
tivities and cause environmental degradation, is not possible due to the great number of 
sources, the diffuse character of pollution and stochastic elements (e.g., weather).  
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Therefore, the environmental inspector, who seeks to implement a given environmental 
policy, can only measure the ambient pollution at specific ‘receptor points’, but cannot 
assign any specific part of the pollutant’s concentration to a specific polluter if there is 
more than one polluter producing the same pollutant.  
 
Braden and Segerson (1993) and other authors refer to problems characterising NPS 
pollution as regards the lack of information (we choose this classification among the 
several existing ones due to its relevance to the case of Romania):  
• problems related to monitoring and measurement. A major informational constraint 
is that of asymmetries between the environmental agency and the polluter. The 
agency is typically less informed than the polluter about the abatement costs and 
technology of pollution reduction. Using the language of the principal-agent rela-
tionship, there is a problem of hidden information or adverse selection. In order to 
set an efficient environmental policy, the inspector must know the costs of the pol-
luter. However, it is not in the interest of the polluter to provide this information 
(since the regulation will negatively affect his revenues, the polluter is motivated to 
overestimate abatement costs and to underestimate its emissions). To limit the prob-
ability of polluter’s unreliable behaviour, the inspector must create an incentive 
mechanism that persuades the polluter to reveal true information, i.e., that provides 
the polluter with a benefit.  
NPS pollution does not fit the traditional principal-agent model, where it is assumed 
that the principal can observe individual output but is concerned with some unob-
served characteristics of the agent or some level of unobserved effort of the agent. In 
the case of NPS, the inspector cannot observe the abatement output from any indi-
vidual nonpoint source. 
When dealing with agricultural NPS, main restrictions arise from the fact that in-
specting agencies are mostly understaffed and underequiped. Furthermore, inspectors 
may fail to enter the polluter’s premises, to detect separate damages across farms and 
to subsequently assign liabilities. The large number of farms contributing to the prob-
lem also decreases the possibility of farms co-operating to reduce pollution levels 
and the likelihood that an individual farm, whose contribution is small relative to the 
total, will ignore/deny the impacts of its practices on resource quality (Tomasi, 
Segerson and Braden, 1994).  
• problems related to natural variability (associated to weather or topographical condi-
tions) that result in stochastic pollution processes.  
 
These problems provide for an explanation of the still modest control of NPS and, in 
particular, of actions to regulate pollution from agricultural sources. Policy-makers face 
difficulties in updating traditional pollution control strategies and regulatory approaches 
in order to address NPS problems. In the case of agricultural NPS pollution, there are 
particularly high transaction costs associated with regulatory policies (research, infor-
mation gathering and analysis; enactment of enabling legislation including lobbying 
costs; design and implementation of a policy; support and administration of on-going 
programs; monitoring/detection; and prosecution/inducement costs) due to the high cost 
of monitoring individual pollutant discharges (McCann and Easter, 1999). 
 
Besides economic activities that are responsible for NPS pollution problems, agricul-
ture, in particular, has substantially been, and continues to be, although to a smaller ex-
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tent, exonerated from mandatory regulation, and has not been confronted by effective 
economic incentives aimed at internalising the social costs of pollution. On the contrary, 
rather than addressing market failures and promoting a more sustainable use of natural 
resources, agricultural policies in transition countries have often added further distor-
tions, and by doing so, have often worsened the misuse of resources.  
 
Designing policies to achieve efficiency (first-best outcome) is often impossible because 
the relationship between economic damages and non-point source pollution is seldom 
known. Instead, policies can be designed to achieve specific environmental goals (such 
as reducing ambient pollution levels or reducing fertiliser applications in a region) at 
least cost, provided that the policy instruments are available to a resource management 
agency and that relevant policy transactions costs and any other political, legal, or in-
formational constraints exist (second-best outcome).  
 
There are difficulties associated with each of these aspects due to the problems men-
tioned above. In contrast to point-source pollution problems, NPS problems must be 
addressed by preventing the generation of the residuals at their source rather than at-
tempting to control the pollutant on its way from source to final point of delivery. 
 
The type of environmental policy action required in any sector is influenced by the mar-
ginal costs and benefits of reducing pollutant levels. The inability to assess the costs of 
the environmental damages stemming from agriculture makes it difficult to determine 
the level of abatement effort necessary and the potential acceptability of the instruments 
attempting to achieve that effort.  
 
Political acceptability of any environmental policy in agriculture is also influenced by 
the composition of the polluters. In Romania, environmental problems arising from ag-
ricultural production are caused by a large number of farms, the majority of which are 
family-owned holdings with low financial means. Given the general need to continue to 
support these farms and the influence of the farm sector to get such support, any poten-
tial policy instrument will need to consider such political facts. Still, small-scale farmers 
in Romania pollute less as compared to agricultural associations and state farms, as they 
usually use lower quantities of potentially polluting inputs. Nevertheless, NPS pollution 
does not depend only on the quantity of agricultural inputs used but also on the farm 
location, timing of input application, and technological practices. All these data are cor-
roborated with stochastic factors, which show that, after all, size of pollution source is 
necessary, but not sufficient in explaining environmental impacts.   
 
The non-point nature of most agricultural externalities limits the applicability of con-
ventional policies used to combat point-source externalities. The NPS pollution problem 
requires the use of others than standard instruments of environmental policy (Pigouvian 
taxes, tradable emission permits, emission standards) as incentives for dischargers to 
follow socially desirable policies (see Griffin and Bromley, 1982).  
 
We give a brief review of policy instruments aimed at controlling pollution from agri-
cultural diffuse sources and their applicability in Romania, focusing on the instruments 
introduced through the reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). These re-
forms were aimed, inter alia, at integrating environmental protection into agricultural 
and rural development policies.  
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Regulatory approaches can be classified according to the reference basis adopted for 
setting policy measures, namely observable total discharges (direct regulatory approach) 
or estimated individual pollutant discharges (indirect regulatory approach).  
Policy instruments consistent with the direct regulatory approach are typically imple-
mented in the form of  
• ambient tax/subsidy policy schemes5 that, broadly speaking, depend on deviations 
between measured and desired ambient pollutant concentrations. Each polluter pays 
a tax that varies proportionally with changes in the ambient concentration. Only in-
formation about the pollutant at the receptor site is required rather than emission 
levels of each polluter and, in addition to the reduced data requirements, the mecha-
nism is also budget balancing. However, this approach is politically less acceptable, 
as it separates between behaviour and penalty. This is a general constraint that ap-
plies mostly everywhere, not only in Romania. 
 
The indirect regulatory approach6 includes the following instruments:  
• estimated emission charges and standards7. There are no models applied in Romania 
that could provide accurate estimates of the complex fate and transport of most agri-
cultural pollutants. But accurate proxies are necessary if this indirect approach is to 
receive political legitimacy. Even if the estimates were accurate, the costs for regu-
lar application of these complex models, particularly in terms of data collection, 
would be so large as to outweigh any gains. 
• marketable emissions permit systems8. The diffuse nature of agricultural pollution 
makes the use of conventional tradable permits infeasible. Therefore, they have been 
modified to a tradable permit system on polluting inputs and a point/non-point 
source trading scheme. Neither of them can be applied in the case of small farms9 in 
Romania due to limitations of the monitoring systems.  
• input- and output-oriented policy measures10. These include input and output levies, 
mandatory restrictions on input use, codes of good agricultural practice, reforms of 
agricultural policies, contingent subsidies (cross-compliance measures), and com-
pensation for abandonment of potentially polluting activities (set-aside).  
As some of these instruments are going to be applied in Romania after accession - 
since they are common instruments applied in the EU-, we present them in more de-
tail in the next subchapter – policy instruments’ concepts together with results of 
their implementation in the EU members. 
 
No single economic instrument emerges as the ideal choice for reducing pollutants from 
agricultural production. Each instrument is appropriate under certain circumstances but 
none by itself adequately addresses the informational and uncertainty problems associ-
ated with diffuse-source pollution prevalent in agriculture. For such problems, the costs 
                                                 
5 Segerson (1988), Cabe and Herriges (1992), Xepapadeas (1991), Bystrom and Bromley (1996). 
6 See seminal papers of Griffin and Bromley (1982) and Shortle & Dunn (1986). 
7 Shortle and Dunn 1986; Dosi and Moretto 1993; Shortle and Abler 1994. 
8 Taylor et al., 2001, Horan et al., 2000, Horan et al., 2001. 
9 The case of big farms (thousands of hectares) would be, of course, different. But then we would move 
away from the NPS case and closer-to-traditional policy instruments could be applied. 
10 Dosi and Zeitouni, 2000. 
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of monitoring and enforcing a given policy are generally inversely related to its effec-
tiveness in meeting the environmental target at minimum total abatement costs.  
 
Performance-based instruments, such as emission and ambient charges, are targeted 
directly at environmental quality but suffer from measurement problems, while design-
based instruments, such as input taxes, can be implemented more easily but suffer from 
the indirect relationship between the chosen design base and environmental damage. 
 
2.2 EU AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL AND RURAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
Codes of good agricultural practice and vulnerable zones  
In EC legislation, the term “good agricultural practice” is more commonly applied to 
the regulation of nitrate pollution from diffuse sources, and in this context, it can be 
seen as being an application to agriculture of the concept of best environmental practice 
that is applied in industry (Nitrate Directive (91/ 676/ EEC). 
 
The EC 1992 agri-environmental programme 
As noticed by Brouwer (2000), it is difficult to assess to what extent CAP has effected 
agricultural development and, in particular, structural changes such as intensification, 
specialisation, and concentration, which are commonly regarded as the causes of the 
observed negative externalities. The agri-environmental programme provides compen-
sations to farmers who undertake to reduce input use, change to other, more extensive 
crop patterns and to more environmentally friendly production methods or set aside 
farmland for at least 20 years with the aim to protect hydrological systems. More than 
20% of the total European Union’s farmland has been effected by Regulation 2078/92 
(European Commission, 1998).  
 
Cross-compliance measures 
Cross-compliance measures require that a producer engages in, or refrains from, speci-
fied activities in order to be eligible for other government programs, such as income  
support programs. The link between farming support and farmers’ environmental per-
formance can be implemented in different ways, with various levels of environmental 
effectiveness. Batie and Sappington (1986) identify two general approaches: the red 
ticket approach, where eligibility for certain benefits is made contingent upon the 
farmer attaining a given environmental standard or set of standards, and the green ticket 
approach, where farmers become eligible for higher levels of support if they comply 
with or exceed a given environmental standard.  
 
EC introduced cross-compliance measures through Agenda 2000, as a Member States’ 
policy option. Cross-compliance is stated by the European Commission as one of the 
elements which has made the CAP truly green. Attaching environmental conditions to 
farmers' support payments is a way of improving their environmental  performance. 
This approach is given new emphasis following the recent changes in the CAP. Cross-
compliance may be seen as a means of addressing concerns, such as the protection of 
water, soil and air, landscape change and the conservation of wildlife.  
 
Land retirement (set-aside) 
Land set-aside is one of the options available for reducing agricultural harmful impacts 
upon groundwater. European Union introduced a voluntary environmentally oriented 
set-aside program within the agri- environmental program established through Regula-
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tion 2078/ 1992. The environmental effectiveness of set-aside programs depends on the 
degree of correlation between farmland productivity and farmland environmental sensi-
tivity as well as on the foreseen compensation for land retirement.  
 
A form of EU intervention in rural areas is the programme  LEADER Plus initiative11. It 
is based on a method for establishing a strategy and actions adapted to the area rather 
than a particular list of standard measures offered for implementation. Among its fea-
tures, we mention the following (as related to the recommendations for our case study): 
• The area-based approach. The geographical area for the intervention is small and 
homogeneous. In this way social, economic and institutional actors know each other 
well and also know what are the strengths and opportunities, the weaknesses and 
constraints of the area; 
• The bottom-up approach. In order to arrive at the actions that will be realised, the 
local actors need to be mobilised through participation and involvement in the for-
mulation of a strategy; 
• The local action group. This is a partnership between private and public actors, rele-
vant at local level, which becomes the agent for stimulating a participatory ap-
proach, defining the strategy and the actions, the costs, the financing and manages 
the implementation of the plan. 
 
Participatory approaches and incentive schemes are most appropriate to the case of 
small rural communities in Romania when dealing with environmental issues. In the 
following subchapter we present the current Romanian environmental policy framework 
that will reveal a lack of instruments to deal specifically with NPS pollution from agri-
culture. Therefore, the subsequent Chapter 3, on policy recommendations will have in 
view both the EU example and the potentials and constraints of the Romanian case.   
 
2.3 THE CURRENT ROMANIAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY FRAMEWORK12 
Current Romanian policies have started to adopt an approach towards sustainability 
based on the integration of the environment into sectoral policies and the reshaping of 
social and economic behaviour through the use of a broader range of instruments and by 
promoting the principle of shared responsibility. The process of increasing environ-
mental awareness has started and has been linked to the EU pre-accession process and 
Romania’s ratification of world conventions on environmental issues. The Romanian 
institutions and legislation in the agri-environmental field have been harmonised gradu-
ally according to the current EU framework, a process that will continue in the long 
term. 
 
In general, Romanian institutions have a relatively recent experience in the field of envi-
ronmental protection. They have a good technical expertise/experience, but limited ex-
                                                 
11 The present framework of rural policy within the European Union was defined in Agenda 2000 in 1997 
and in 1999 in Berlin, with the final decisions on the financial allocations for the period 2000-2006. The 
first and most important one is the Regulation for Rural Development (Reg. 1257/99). A second form of 
intervention in rural areas is also possible with the Structural Funds either in objective 1 (lagging be-
hind) and objective 2 (conversion of areas facing structural difficulties) areas. A third instrument is the 
LEADER Plus Community Initiative. 
12 Water quality relevant. 
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perience in management, economics and enforcement of the environmental legislation. 
Their main weaknesses are (European Commission, 2000): 1) insufficient co-ordination 
at the central level between the ministries involved, in need of more clearly defined re-
sponsibilities and a better communication; 2) limited experience in introducing eco-
nomic instruments and in managing human resources and projects; 3) limited staff en-
gaged in the overall process and 4) lack of equipment at the local level. As regards the 
non-governmental institutions dealing with environmental issues, they are perceived as 
the most dynamic field in the Romanian civil society. They have started to exert greater 
influence on the quality of the Romanian environment, but, at present, they are not as 
powerful as to actually influence the environmental policy.   
 
The current legislative framework in the field of water management and pollution 
abatement has been focussed on the EU harmonisation process (Romanian Government 
2002a, 2002b). The position paper for Chapter 22, Environment, has been submitted to 
the EU Council during the Belgian Presidency of the EU Council (sem. II/2001) and has 
been opened during the Spanish Presidency of the EU Council (sem. I/2002). Romania 
will implement the acquis communautaire in the field of environmental protection until 
the date of accession, with the exception of some EU legal acts13. Successful enforce-
ment of environmental legislation depends widely on training level and financial re-
source allocation necessary for technical endowment. Transposition and implementation 
of the acquis in the field of environmental protection represent a difficult process be-
cause of the inter-sectoral character and of the impact of the related problems on the 
whole Romanian industry. This process implies significant costs and imposes structural 
changes on the Romanian economy. 
 
Water policy instruments currently used in Romania14  
There are two basic types of permits: environmental permits (i.e., permits for operation) 
and environmental agreements (i.e., permits for new investment). Permits are issued for 
a maximum of five years. The procedure and activities subject to permitting have been 
introduced by the Environmental Framework Law (No. 137/1995). Prior to the issuing 
of a permit, an environmental impact assessment should be carried out. The basic pro-
cedure (i.e. public consultation) is set out in the Framework Law. The permits’ require-
ments are established by the Inspectorates for Environmental Protection on a case-by-
case basis. In some specific cases of water use, the Romanian Waters National Com-
pany issues an additional technical opinion.  
 
In Romania there is a unitary economic mechanism for the water management products 
and services, which consists of: prices; tariff; penalties; and allowances (bonus) – water 
charges. The tariffs are levied on a set of emission charges on water pollution aimed at 
reducing the pollutant substances in the river flows at the limits set by the law. If the 
limits are exceeded, fines or penalties are levied. The penalties are levied for the non-
compliance with the permits or contracts, both for water intakes and discharges for 
wastewater. The purpose is to reduce the environmentally harmful impacts of certain 
activities and to enforce the users to respect the provisions of the permits.  
                                                 
13 We mention the ones related to water quality: Council Directive No 98/83/EC on the quality of water 
intended for human consumption (Romania requests a transition period of 15 years, until 2022); Council 
Directive No 91/676/EEC concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from 
agricultural sources (Romania requests a transition period of 7 years, until 2014). 
14 General framework, not non-point source pollution abatement focused. 
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There are also water pollution non-compliance fees and financial mechanisms for the 
completion, modernisation and rehabilitation of water quality improvements (water 
supply, wastewater treatment plant, sewage systems and networks, etc.) These mecha-
nisms include state subsidies, government-guaranteed loans and exemption from import 
duties on environment technologies. The Water Law 107/1996 and Government Decree 
GD 1001/1990 deal with pricing policy for all sectors. These policies are, however, un-
der review and new methodologies are being elaborated for the more efficient allocation 
of water. 
 
Three charging systems for waste disposal are applied: for households (a fee per house-
hold, based on family size); for industry and other waste producers (a fee per ton of 
waste generated) and for disposal at public disposal sites and landfills (a charge per ton 
dumped). There are no special charges for hazardous waste; the charge for ‘normal’ 
waste is applied. Waste disposal standards are much below EU standards and have to be 
updated. 
 
A series of new instruments are being considered by the Ministry of Waters and Envi-
ronmental Protection, although not yet adopted. The instruments include flood protec-
tion fees and dam protection and enhancement fees, fertiliser and pesticide product 
charges. The Ministry is also exploring the introduction of emission trading and the 
trading of effluent discharge permits (which would enable industry and municipal sew-
age treatment plants to trade Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD), nitrogen and phos-
phate discharges). Further measures are also under consideration, such as an increase in 
effluent tariffs based on quantities and distinguishing between various types of sus-
pended and discharged substances, the improvement of penalty systems to further dis-
courage non-compliance and the re-introduction of deposit refund systems. 
 
3 SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS  
There are several types of policies to deal with NPS abatement and aiming at sustain-
able agriculture. As discussed above, policy instruments that are based on the direct 
regulatory approach - typically taking on the form of ambient tax/subsidy policy 
schemes - are politically less acceptable in the case of Romania due to the separation 
between behaviour and penalty.  
 
As regards the indirect regulatory approach, it would be difficult to use of estimated 
emission charges & standards and of marketable emissions permit systems to deal with 
agricultural NPS. There are no models applied in Romania that could provide accurate 
estimates of the complex fate and transport of most agricultural pollutants, but accurate 
proxies are necessary if this indirect approach shall receive political legitimacy. Even if 
the estimates were accurate, the costs of regularly applying these complex models, par-
ticularly in terms of data collection, would be so large as to outweigh any gains. The 
diffuse nature of agricultural pollution makes the use of conventional tradable permits 
infeasible, therefore they have been modified to a tradable permit system on polluting 
inputs and a point/non-point source trading scheme. Neither of them can be applied in 
the case of small farms in Romania due to limitations of the monitoring systems.  
 
Taking the results of our case study into account as well as farmers’ characteristics, 
types of pollution and general developments of Romanian agriculture and rurality dur-
ing transition, and having in view the current and forecasted developments of the Euro-
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pean Union Common Agricultural Policy, we make the following policy recommenda-
tions for a sustainable agriculture: 
• Create incentives for the farmers to adopt best management practices at farm level 
(environmentally friendly); these would include reduction of barn waste, animal 
waste management (manure storage and management), diversions, grazing land pro-
tection. With the view to the characteristics of the Romanian farmers (as presented 
in our results of the previous research phases), carrot approach would be more suit-
able than the stick one.  
Therefore, we suggest establishing water quality incentive projects to provide finan-
cial assistance for adopting alternative management systems. Targeting programs to 
regions where agriculture is the primary source of environmental impairment is one 
of the most important ways of enhancing program cost-effectiveness. This depends 
on conditions of natural resources, gravity of those conditions, expected improve-
ments, resources from project activities, societal benefits, likely producer participa-
tion, and availability of local resources. These types of projects should allow for an 
adequate timeframe to overcome constraints to adoption and the lags between on-
field changes and off-site effects. Farmers must be convinced that there is a problem 
to be addressed, learn about alternative management practices, adopt the practices, 
and successfully implement them.  
• Design local participatory strategies to co-interest agricultural producers in reducing 
agricultural NPS pollution. One aspect of the participatory issues would relate either 
to subsidies/direct support to farmers, who would adopt environmentally friendly 
agricultural practices, or to state environmental regulations if the problems would 
not be solved through voluntary NPS control measures. It has been proved for many 
categories of environmental problems that implementing environmental policies 
through responsible groups can be more effective or less costly than through indi-
viduals. Such approaches may be the most appropriate for dealing with the many 
environmental issues that are predominantly local in nature.  
The motivation for farmers to form or join environmental co-operatives is in most 
cases related to protecting the value of their farm assets and avoiding ‘burdensome’ 
regulations. The farmers should be convinced that, by voluntary action, they would 
more likely achieve satisfactory locally acceptable solutions to pollution problems 
than would some outside authority. The most common activity has been to work to-
gether in preparing farm plans that usually take the shape of a ‘whole farm ap-
proach’, encouraging farmers to consider all the environmental, economic and socio-
logical factors that impact the sustainability of their farms.  
Considering the process of environmental internalisation from a dynamic perspec-
tive, voluntary approaches are particularly appropriate as transitional measures, espe-
cially in situations where demands for changes in environmental performance are be-
ing imposed for the first time. The technology is usually underdeveloped and, more-
over, the information available to environmental agencies is usually poor.  
The emergence of voluntary farm community groups in several countries appear to 
have been prompted by one or more of the following motives (OECD, 2001):  
- concern about declining farm profitability; 
- increasing awareness of the linkages between certain aspects of ecological 
sustainability and farm financial sustainability; 
- fear that solutions to problems of sustainability, in general, and pollution, in 
particular, would be imposed by a central authority, combined. This fear goes 
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along with the confidence within the groups that by taking their own initiative 
they would be more likely to achieve satisfactory, locally acceptable results 
than if they were simply to wait for the government to impose a solution. 
This reasoning is closely linked to the rationale of the farmers in our case study area, 
proceeding from the appropriateness of supporting voluntary action instead of apply-
ing control and command policies. But the effectiveness of the voluntary approach is 
critically dependent on the credibility of the understanding and the ability of gov-
ernment to monitor performance. Moreover, the suitability of participatory ap-
proaches may be limited by the motivation of farmers to participate in such activities, 
and the environmental issues they are both willing to address and capable to address 
effectively.  
• Support local research on the environmental and economic performance of best man-
agement practices. Farmers tend to be sceptical about practices implying national 
standards when there is no local history of use. Alternative practices new to an area 
need to be locally field tested so that farmers can see the environmental and eco-
nomic benefits first-hand.  
• Design an effective information and education program for farmers on local envi-
ronmental problems and the impacts their operations have on these problems; make 
results available to the community to enhance public education and contribute to 
more effective management of water quality problems in the future. The develop-
ment of the existent agricultural knowledge system (regional agricultural consul-
tancy agency) would prove a useful educational tool. If farmers neither believe that 
there is a water quality problem nor think that the water quality problem is caused 
by agriculture, education programs must both educate them about water quality is-
sues and assist them in recognising the ways in which their farming practices con-
tribute to the problem. 
• Make available a full range of education, technical, and financial assistance (USDA, 
1997). There are a number of constraints to farmers adopting alternative manage-
ment practices that cannot be fully addressed by a single type of assistance. Educa-
tion can inform producers about innovative practices, technical assistance reduces 
the private cost of obtaining information about a particular practice on a particular 
farm, helps provide managerial skill that may be lacking, and financial assistance 
helps overcome a short planning horizon, allows the farmer to accept greater risk 
beyond the short run, and provides an incentive to try something new.  
• Propose strategies for a better inter-agency co-operation (e.g., the relationship be-
tween environmental protection agencies, agricultural consultancy agencies, agricul-
tural directorates, farmers associations, local authorities, local NGOs). Local groups 
assess natural resource conditions and needs, identify environmental priorities and 
resources available, develop proposals for priority areas, and make program policy 
recommendations. Making use of farmers’ site-specific knowledge in planning 
processes at the regional level can help improve coherence between farm-level ac-
tions and regional initiatives.  
• Reform agricultural policies in ways that contribute to reduce distortions in the use 
and quality of water resources, and enhance environmental benefits associated with 
water use in agriculture. 
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• Establish transparent water management policies in order to identify the full eco-
nomic, environmental and social costs and benefits of water use in agriculture, and 
any associated transfers between farmers, taxpayers and consumers. 
• Strengthen the legal framework and institutions to promote greater efficiency in the 
allocation and use of water; clarify water rights systems; encourage farmers, water 
service providers and users to form associations aimed at improved water manage-
ment. 
• Improve the existent information on the agri-environmental processes involved in the 
linkages between agriculture, water and environment, such as by funding public and 
private research and development; build a better body of knowledge at public and 
decision-making levels about the hydrological and environmental aspects of water 
systems, and the relationship between water resources and water quality and poli-
cies. 
 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
Political acceptability of any environmental policy in agriculture is influenced, inter 
alia, by the composition of the polluters. In Romania, environmental problems arising 
from agricultural production are caused by a large number of farms, the majority of 
which are family-owned holdings with low financial means. Given the general need to 
continue to support these farms and the influence of the farm sector to get such support, 
any potential policy instrument will need to consider such political realities. 
 
The non-point nature of most agricultural externalities limits the applicability of con-
ventional policies used to combat point-source externalities. NPS pollution problem 
requires the use of other than standard instruments of environmental policy as incen-
tives for dischargers to follow socially desirable policies.  
 
No single economic instrument emerges as the ideal choice for reducing pollutants from 
agricultural production. Each instrument is appropriate under certain circumstances, but 
none of it by itself adequately addresses the informational and uncertainty problems 
associated with diffuse-source pollution prevalent in agriculture. 
 
Designing local participatory strategies to co-interest agricultural producers in reducing 
agricultural NPS pollution, together with related policy recommendations for a sustain-
able agriculture are most appropriate having in view the insights of our case study. 
 
The small rural community where our case study took place is one of the many with 
similar economic, social and environmental background in Romania. Therefore, carry-
ing out similar surveys in other rural areas would permit an extended evaluation of rural 
population’s concern as regards environmental issues, would allow analysing and decid-
ing upon the best policy and institutional tools to be applied locally and regionally for 
accomplishing a sustainable agricultural development.   
 
Replicating our survey not only in space, but also in time would make available time-
series data, which would allow assessing the outcomes of the proposed sustainable poli-
cies, i.e. the evaluation of environmental quality and general rural community welfare 
trends.  
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